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Android remains the dominant OS in the smartphone market even though the iOS share of
the market increased during the iPhone 6 release period. As various types of Android
smartphones are being launched in the market, forensic studies are being conducted to
test data acquisition and analysis. However, since the application of new Android security
technologies, it has become more difﬁcult to acquire data using existing forensic methods.
In order to address this problem, we propose a new acquisition method based on analyzing
the ﬁrmware update protocols of Android smartphones. A physical acquisition of Android
smartphones can be achieved using the ﬂash memory read command by reverse engi-
neering the ﬁrmware update protocol in the bootloader. Our experimental results
demonstrate that the proposed method is superior to existing forensic methods in terms of
the integrity guarantee, acquisition speed, and physical dump with screen-locked smart-
phones (USB debugging disabled).
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
articleunder theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The Android OS accounted for approximately 84% of the
market share in the third quarter of 2014 (Smartphone OS
Market Share Q3 2014). The size of the Android smart-
phone market now exceeds that of the PC market and
various technologies are emerging continuously for per-
sonal and business use (Bring your own device, 2014). This
trend is increasing the importance of Android forensics,
where research into the physical acquisition of ﬂash
memory is particularly necessary to aid the recovery and
analysis of deleted ﬁles.
The existing Android physical acquisition methods have
the following problems.þ82 10 2321 4588;
mwiz.com (S.J. Yang).
vier Ltd on behalf of DFRWFirst, most forensic tools acquire data from smartphones
by exploiting Android kernel vulnerabilities or using
custom images (Rooting (Android OS), 2014; Vidas et al.,
2011). However, these vulnerabilities have been patched
as the Android OS has been upgraded and physical memory
dumping is not supported in the latest OS until a new
vulnerability can be found. Furthermore, the recent appli-
cations of security technologies (Secure boot, 2014;
Samsung KNOX, 2014) make it even harder to acquire
data from smartphones.
Second, the dump method based on changing the
custom recovery image (Son et al., 2013) is the only
approach that takes into account the integrity of the user
data. However, this method cannot guarantee the integrity
of the entire ﬂash memory dump because it also ﬂashes the
custom recovery image.
Third, existing forensic tools use the Android Debug
Bridge (ADB) protocol to acquire data from smartphones.
Thus, it is difﬁcult to acquire data when smartphones are
locked by a pattern or user password (USB debugging
disabled).S. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
S.J. Yang et al. / Digital Investigation 14 (2015) S68eS76 S69In order to address these problems, we propose a new
physical acquisition method based on analyzing the ﬁrm-
ware update protocols of Android smartphones.
Related work
Software (S/W)-based and hardware (H/W)-based
acquisition methods are mainly used to acquire data from
Android smartphones.
The S/W-based acquisition methods are divided into
logical acquisition and physical acquisition.
Logical acquisition methods acquire user data stored on
a smartphone via ADB Backup (Android Backup Extractor,
2014) or Content Provider (Hoog, 2011). However, this
method only retrieves stored ﬁles such as the call history
and pictures, and it cannot recover deleted ﬁles.
Physical acquisition methods extract the overall data
directly from the smartphone's ﬂash memory after con-
necting a USB cable. To perform a physical dump of the
ﬂash memory, the rooting process required to obtain an
administrative privilege must be performed ﬁrst. The
rooting-based acquisition studies were introduced in the
scholarly works (Hoog, 2009; Lessard and Kessler, 2010).
These studies discussed Android forensics, including
acquisition methods that root the HTC smartphones and
use ADB shell. However, these methods can only be used to
acquire data when the USB debugging mode is enabled.
Commercial forensic tools (Oxygen Forensics, 2014;
AccessData MPEþ, 2014; MSAB XRY, 2015) also use this
method. However, because the rooting exploitation process
is executed after the smartphone is booted; the integrity is
damaged whenever data is acquired. In addition, existing
rooting vulnerabilities are patched whenever the Android
OS is updated with a new version; hence, a new rooting
technique must be found whenever the Android OS is
updated.
Cellebrite UFED 4PC (2015) basically supports an ADB
physical memory dump via rooting exploitation, while
some Samsung models support physical memory dumping
via a custom bootloader. However, this method has the
problem that each model has to upload a different boot-
loader rather than uploading a common loader for physical
memory dump. Because the physical dump is not sup-
ported in some models in the same Galaxy series, this
method is not regarded as stable.
An acquisition method based on changing the custom
recovery image has been studied in the scholarly works
(Vidas et al., 2011; Son et al., 2013). Use of the custom
recovery image guarantees the integrity of the user data.
However, this method cannot guarantee the integrity of
the entire ﬂash memory dump because it also ﬂashes the
custom recovery image. The acquisition method must
have USB debugging enabled because it uses the ADB
shell protocol to acquire data from smartphones. How-
ever, because USB debugging is usually disabled, this
method is not applicable if the pattern lock or user
password is set. Moreover, the Secure Boot and Samsung
KNOX technologies applied recently to Android place
restrictions on the ﬂashing of custom images, which will
make it difﬁcult when using this acquisition method in
the future.Flasher tools (RIFF box, 2014; ORT tool, 2014; Z3X box,
2014) are also used to extract data from mobile devices.
However, the main function of these tools is to ﬁx the
bricked phones that have S/W damages. So these tools are
not considered as general forensic tools.
Representative H/W-based acquisition methods include
JTAG-based acquisition (Kim et al., 2008; Breeuwsma et al.,
2007) and Chip-off-based acquisition (Jovanovic, 2012).
The JTAG-based acquisition method extracts data from the
ﬂash memory using the JTAG debug interface on the
smartphone's PCB board. The Chip-off-based method
physically removes ﬂash memory chips from the PCB board
of smartphones and acquires the raw data of the ﬂash
memory. The JTAG-based acquisition method is problem-
atic because not all smartphones support JTAG and it takes
a long time to acquire data. The Chip-off-based acquisition
method is utilized in limited situations because it separates
the ﬂash memory.
Also, there were various studies conducted on Android
forensics. As the capacity of the main memory grows in
Android smartphones, the forensic research for volatile
memory was introduced (Sylve et al., 2012). The analysis of
social networking applications (Mutawa et al., 2012), the
prototype enterprise monitoring system for Android
smartphones (Grover, 2013), and the Kindle forensics
(Hannay, 2011; Iqbal et al., 2013) were also studied.
Background
Flash memory is used mainly to store data on smart-
phones. Because the ﬂash memory is small and it can store
a large amount of data, it is used widely in embedded de-
vices such as smartphones and feature phones. Recently
embeddedMulti-Media Card (eMMC) that integrates NAND
ﬂash and a controller into a package has been used; this
manages stored data by efﬁciently using the EXTended ﬁle
system 4 (EXT4). Moreover, it mounts and operates parti-
tions such as BOOT, RECOVERY, SYSTEM, and USERDATA.
An administrative privilege must be obtained before the
physical dump of the entire ﬂash memory. Thus, a custom
image is overwritten in the BOOT partition in order to
obtain the administrative privilege, and an app (Super-
User.apk) and a binary (/system/su) are installed in the
SYSTEM partition. In addition, the administrative privilege
is obtained via rooting exploitation in the recovery mode or
by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Android OS.
In general, Google's FASTBOOT (Android software
development-fastboot, 2014) is used for ﬂashing a custom
image. Each manufacturer provides their own ﬁrmware
update programs (Samsung Kies, 2014; Samsung Odin,
2014; LG Software & tools Download, 2014; Pantech Self-
Upgrade, 2014; HTC Sync Manager, 2014; Sony PC Com-
panion, 2014; Xiaomi Download MiFlash for Xiaomi
Smartphone, 2015) in order to prevent the simple ﬂashing
through FASTBOOT provided by Google, and they do not
publish a protocol so only the original ﬁrmware can ﬂash.
The ﬁrmware update process runs only when smartphones
enter a special mode called ﬁrmware update, or the
download mode. Only the bootloader and USB function can
operate in this mode and a new system ﬁrmware can be
ﬂashed.
Fig. 1. Firmware update mode (Samsung, LG, and Pantech).
Table 1
Methods used for entering the ﬁrmware update mode.
Model Mode name Key combination
Samsung Galaxy ODIN Press and hold, at the same
time, Volume Down, Home
and Power key (then press
Volume Up key) or Connect
300 K ohm USB Jig
LG Optimus DOWNLOAD Press and hold Volume Up
key þ plug in the phone into
a computer using a microUSB
cable or Connect 910 K
ohm USB Jig
Pantech Vega PDL download Press and hold, at the same
time, Volume Up, Volume Down,
Home, and Power key
Google Nexus 4/5 DOWNLOAD Press and hold Volume Up
key þ plug in the phone
into a computer using
a microUSB cable or Connect
910 K ohm USB Jig
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analyzed by reverse engineering the bootloader and ﬁrm-
ware update program using a tool such as IDA Pro (Hex-
Rays, 2015).
Android physical acquisition based on ﬁrmware
update protocols
From a forensic viewpoint, ﬂash memory that contains
user data is the main target during data acquisition. This
process requires a physical acquisition method to acquire
the entire ﬂash memory, rather than a logical acquisition
method.
During the ﬁrmware update process, new ﬁrmware is
ﬂashed in the ﬂash memory in order to update the Android
OS or patch S/W problems. A ﬁrmware update protocol is
the only way to access the ﬂashmemory directly through S/
W, and thus we can derive a new physical memory acqui-
sition method by analyzing the commands used in the
ﬁrmware update process. There was no research that ana-
lyzes ﬁrmware update protocols in order to solve the
problems of existing forensic acquisition tools so far. In the
present study, we analyzed the ﬁrmware update protocols
used by LG, Pantech, and Samsung smartphones. In the LG
and Pantech models, we found that not only commands for
direct access to ﬂash memory and the write commands for
ﬂashing but also the read commands for ﬂash memory
dumping were preserved intact. In Samsung models, we
conﬁrmed that there were the read commands for ﬂash
memory dumping, but the actual dump code had been
removed. Based on these analytical results, we propose a
new physical acquisition method for Android smartphones.
Firmware update protocol
If an Android smartphone is turned on or reset, the ROM
is executed from address 0 and initialization processes are
executed, including CPU conﬁguration. Next, the boot-
loader is loaded onto the memory, and H/W is initialized
and conﬁgured, such as NAND and USB. Bootloader
execution passes through several stages, such as Initial
BootLoader (IBL), Primary BootLoader (PBL), Secondary
BootLoader (SBL), and a ﬁrmware update protocol is
implemented in the SBL bootloader or ABOOT bootloader
depending on the Android model. Using a reverse engi-
neering tool, it is possible to analyze the bootloader and
identify the commands used for ﬁrmware updates.
To update ﬁrmware or acquire data by accessing ﬂash
memory, the smartphone should be in the ﬁrmware update
mode rather than the normal boot mode. Because only the
bootloader and USB module are activated in this mode, the
integrity of the acquired data is guaranteed even after
physical acquisition multiple times. Thus, if the evidence
phone is booted in the ﬁrmware update mode with its
power off and physical acquisition is then executed, the
integrity can be preserved to dump an image of the ﬂash
memory. Fig. 1 shows the displays when Samsung, LG, and
Pantech smartphones are booted in the ﬁrmware update
mode.
The terms used to indicate the ﬁrmware update mode
and methods when entering the ﬁrmware update modediffer amongmanufacturers. Table 1 shows themethods for
entering the ﬁrmware update mode when a smartphone
boots. USB Jig is a simple circuit that gets into the ﬁrmware
update mode for smartphones. Samsung and LG smart-
phones can be just entered into the ﬁrmware update mode
according to 300 K and 910 KOhms of resistors betweenpin
4 and 5 of the microUSB connector (XDA developers, 2012a,
2012b). These USB Jig cables wouldn't be used to overcome
any of the existing limitations such as Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) unlock.Analysis of LG ﬁrmware update protocols
For LG smartphones, we analyzed the ﬁrmware update
processes and commands by decompiling the bootloader
and the update program (LG Software & tools Download,
2014) provided by LG, and we identiﬁed the read com-
mand used for dumping the ﬂash memory.
LG ﬁrmware update commands
LG ﬁrmware update protocol operates in the structure
when sending a command packet and receiving a reply
packet. The packets use the High-Level Data Link Control
(HDLC) frame structure, starting with HDLC ﬂag (0x7E)
followed by packet data and Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC)-16, and ending with HDLC ﬂag (0x7E). Fig. 2 shows
Fig. 2. LG ﬁrmware update command format.
Fig. 3. Reverse engineering of the LG SBL3 bootloader.
Fig. 4. LG read command format (0x50).
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smartphones.
After entering the LG ﬁrmware update mode, the com-
mands for acquiring device information, GUID Partition
Table (GPT) partition information, and memory informa-
tion can be used. Table 2 shows the LG ﬁrmware update
commands.
LG ﬁrmware update processes are as follows.
1 Get device information: 0x00.
2 Switch to download mode: 0x3A.
3 Query features (Protocol ver., etc.): 0x2F.
4 Get Partition information: 0x30.
5 Get factory information: 0xFA.
6 Write sector (Primary GPT): 0x39.
7 Repeat of partition ﬂashing: 0x39.
8 Complete download: 0x38.
9 Reset system: 0x0A.LG ﬂash memory dump command
Based on the results obtained by reverse engineering
the ﬁrmware update commands in the bootloader, we
identiﬁed the read commands for ﬂash memory in addi-
tion to those shown in Table 2. Fig. 3 shows the read
command (0x50) for ﬂash memory obtained by reverse
engineering the SBL3 bootloader in the Optimus G model
(LG-E975).
After entering the ﬁrmware update mode according to
the process described in Table 1, the command for ﬂash
memory information acquisition (0x30) is sent to obtain
the size of the ﬂash memory and GPT partition infor-
mation. The acquired information comprises the size of
the ﬂash memory, number of partitions, start address,
end address, and name of each partition. The read com-
mand for the ﬂash memory (0x50) is sent with the start
address and dump size, and the requested size of the
ﬂash memory data can then be acquired. Fig. 4 shows theTable 2
LG ﬁrmware update commands.
Command Description
0x00 Get device information (model, compile date)
0x3A Go download mode
0x2F Get protocol version, algorithm version
0x30 Get MMC and Partition information
0xFA Get factory information (IMEI, Mac address)
0x12 Read RAM memory
0x39 Write ﬂash memory
0x0A Reset systemformat of the read command (0x50) for ﬂash memory.
Fig. 5 shows an example of data acquisition. The physical
acquisition of all models can be performed using the read
command regardless of Android OS and kernel version.
Moreover, because it is booted in the ﬁrmware update
mode, the integrity of the dump image is always
maintained.
Analysis of Pantech ﬁrmware update protocol
We also analyzed the ﬁrmware update process and
commands by reverse engineering the ﬁrmware update
program (Pantech Self-Upgrade, 2014) provided by Pantech
and the bootloader, and we identiﬁed the ﬂash memory
read command.Fig. 5. LG data acquisition example (LG-F240S).
Fig. 6. Pantech read command for ﬂash memory (0x06).
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In Pantech models, the ﬁrmware update commands are
implemented in the ABOOT bootloader. Thus, the ﬁrmware
update commands used in the update process can be
analyzed by reverse engineering the ABOOT bootloader.
Table 3 shows the ﬁrmware update commands used in
Pantech smartphones. The ﬁrmware update commands are
executed after entering the ﬁrmware update mode, as
shown in Table 1. The length of the command packet varies
according to the smartphone model. Thus, a 32-byte com-
mand packet was used up to the Vega Iron (IM-A870S)
model, whereas a 128-byte packet was used in subsequent
models.
Pantech ﬁrmware update processes are as follows.
1 Get device information: AT*PHONEINFO.
2 Switch to download mode: AT*PDL*START.
3 Start ﬁrmware update: 0x00.
4 Ready partition ﬂashing: 0x02.
5 Erase partition with sector size: 0x04.
6 Write partition with sector size: 0x05.
7 Repeat of processes 5 and 6.
8 Complete partition ﬂashing: 0x03.
9 Reset system: 0x01.Pantech ﬂash memory dump command
Based on the results obtained by reverse engineering
the ﬁrmware update commands in the bootloader, the 0x06
command was found to be the read command for ﬂash
memory. Fig. 6 shows the structures of the read commands
with packet lengths of 32 bytes and 128 bytes.
Information related to the GPT partition should be ac-
quired before physical acquisition of the ﬂash memory. The
GPT partition (partition ID ¼ 0x0A) is acquired using the
read command for ﬂash memory (0x06) and the partition
information is then analyzed. Based on the results of the
analysis, physical acquisition is executed for a partition or
for the entire ﬂash memory. The physical acquisition of all
models can be performed regardless of the Android OS and
kernel version. Because it is booted in the ﬁrmware update
mode, the integrity of the dump image can always be
maintained, as found in the LG models. Fig. 7 shows an
example of data acquisition from the Vega Iron2 (IM-
A910S) model.
Analysis of Samsung ﬁrmware update protocol
For Samsung smartphones, we analyzed the ﬁrmware
update protocol in the bootloader and found that thereTable 3
Pantech ﬁrmware update commands.
Command Description
0x00 Firmware update ready command
0x01 Reset command
0x02 Write ready command
0x03 Write complete command
0x04 Partition erase command
0x05 Partition write commandwere the read commands for the ﬂash memory but the
actual code for reading the ﬂash memory had been
removed.
Samsung ﬁrmware update commands
In the Samsung ﬁrmware update protocol, a PC sends a
command packet, and a smartphone processes the com-
mand and sends back the results in a reply packet. The
command packet comprises 1024 bytes, and it executes a
different function according to the values of the ﬁrst 4
bytes. Fig. 8 shows the format of the Samsung ﬁrmware
update command. Table 4 shows the ﬁrmware update
commands used in Samsung models.Fig. 7. Pantech data acquisition example (IM-A910S).
Fig. 8. Samsung ﬁrmware update command format.
Fig. 9. Reverse engineering of the read command in bootloader.
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ﬁrmware update protocol is initialized by sending the 0x64
command packet. After sending the 0x65 command packet,
the partition information table of the new ﬁrmware is then
uploaded in the main memory. Next, the 0x66 command
packet is sent and the ﬁrmware based on the new partition
information is ﬂashed in the ﬂash memory, and the 0x67
command packet is set to complete the ﬁrmware update
process. The 0x66 sub commands (0x01, and 0x03) can
acquire data from the ﬂash memory, but the actual dump
code has been removed. If the read command (CMD: 0x66,
SUBCMD: 0x01, 0x03) is sent, the smartphone only sends
an ACK message without data. We only checked whether
the ﬂash memory read function had been removed in the
Galaxy S2 and subsequent models. Fig. 9 shows the read
command by reverse engineering Samsung bootloader
using the IDA Pro tool. It is difﬁcult to acquire data of ﬂash
memory using the read command because the dump code
is removed. Thus, in order to conduct physical acquisition,
additional research for patching the read command is
required.
Android physical acquisition process
After analyzing the ﬁrmware update protocols of LG and
Pantech smartphones, we found that the read command for
ﬂashmemory was preserved and physical acquisition couldTable 4
Samsung ﬁrmware update commands.
Command Sub
commands
Description
0x64 0x00 Firmware update protocol
initialization command
e
0x65 0x00 Partition information table
write ready command
e
0x01 Partition information table
read ready command
e
0x02 Partition information table
write/read command
e
0x66 0x00 Write ready command for
ﬂash memory
e
0x01 Read ready command for
ﬂash memory
Code
removal
0x02 Write command for ﬂash
memory
e
0x03 Read command for ﬂash
memory
Code
removal
0x67 0x01 Firmware update complete
command
ebe performed using this command. There was the ﬂash
memory read command in the ﬁrmware update commands
in Samsung models, but the actual dump code had been
removed. Based on this analysis, we developed a new
physical acquisition procedure for Android smartphones.
First, check whether there is the ﬂash memory read com-
mand by reverse engineering the ﬁrmware update protocol
in the bootloader. If there is a read command, execute
physical acquisition in the LG and Pantech models. If not,
additional research for patching the read command is
required.
Android physical dump
Using the acquisition method proposed in the paper, we
developed an acquisition tool called Android Physical
Dump (APD) and it is written in Cþþ. Fig. 10 shows the APD
tool. After connecting via a USB cable, it selects buttons for
physical acquisition.
Supported models
The APD tool currently supports over 80 of the latest
Android models. Currently, APD can perform physical
dumps from LG Optimus, Pantech Vega, and Google Nexus
models. Representative examples of the models supported
are as follows: LG G3, G2, G, Pantech R3, Iron2, Nexus 4/5,
and G Watch.
Boot with ﬁrmware update mode
In the ﬁrst physical dump step, the smartphone is
booted in the ﬁrmware update mode, as described in Table
Fig. 10. Android physical dump (APD).
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the AT command or the download mode command.
However, if physical memory acquisition is executed after
normal boot, the hash value of the acquired data can be
changed each time that acquisition is performed. There-
fore, after the evidence phone has been collected, it needs
to be turned off and booted with the ﬁrmware update
mode.
Connect to the phone and acquire the model information
Connect to the smartphone using a USB cable. The USB
driver must be installed in advance. The USB driver can be
downloaded from the manufacturer's homepage. After
connecting a USB cable, select the Acquire Model and GPT
information button. If the user only selects the manufac-
turer, the smartphone model name is displayed automati-
cally. After acquiring the model information, the partition
information is obtained by sending the GPT partition in-
formation command. As shown in Fig. 10, the window
presents the partition name, start address, and end address
for each partition.
Physical acquisition
The APD tool was implemented to support a partition
dump and a whole ﬂash memory dump. After the Dump
Selected Partitions button is selected, a physical dump of
the relevant partition is performed. After the dump process,
the dump time and MD5 hash value of the dump image are
displayed in the Dump Log window.
The Full Dump button is selected to acquire the entire
ﬂash memory. The physical acquisition process is executed
using the start and end addresses of the ﬂash memory inthe acquired GPT partition information. After the acquisi-
tion process is complete, the investigator information,
acquisition tool information, and dump information are
displayed, as shown in Fig. 10. The dump information in-
dicates the starting time and ending time, where the MD5
hash value is calculated and displayed for the dump image.
Hash value calculation is important for checking the
integrity of the dump image.
The ﬁle acquired using the APD tool is raw data format
and can be analyzed through smartphone forensic tools
(Cellebrite UFED Physical Analyzer, 2015; Guidance EnCase,
2014; R-Linux, 2014).
Experiments
The most important factors in the area of Android
forensic acquisition are guaranteeing the integrity of the
dump image, rapid evidence collection, and dump avail-
ability in an anti-forensic environment due to the pattern
lock and user password. Based on these three factors, we
compared the APD tool proposed in the present study with
existing acquisition methods using the latest Android
smartphones. The tools compared were the well-known
Cellebrite UFED 4PC, dump method based on a custom
recovery image, ADB physical dump via rooting exploita-
tions, and JTAG-based acquisition. Table 5 shows the
experimental results obtained. The following different
models were used in the tests: G3 (F400S, D851), Optimus
G (F180S, E975), R3 (IM-A850S), Iron2 (IM-A910S), and
Nexus 4/5 (E960, D821). After completing the process of
dumping the ﬂash memory with the APD tool, we would
check the dumped image using the Cellebrite UFED
Physical Analyzer (2015) to determine the quality of the
acquired dumped image.
Table 5
Experimental results.
Item Proposed
method (APD)
Cellebrite
UFED 4PC
Custom recovery
mode dump
ADB dump using
root exploitation
JTAG-based
acquisition
Integrity guaranteed O X X X O
Acquisition speed (size: 32 GB) 30 min 120 min 120 min 180 min 480 mina
Dump of smartphone with screen-lock O X X X O
a JTAG-based acquisition method excludes the disintegration and connection time.
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In a previous study (Son et al., 2013), the user data
integrity was checked with a JTAG-based acquisition
method. This method guarantees the integrity of the user
data because it only ﬂashes a custom recovery image.
However, the integrity of the entire ﬂash memory is
damaged because the recovery partition of the ﬂash
memory is modiﬁed. The integrity is also damaged in Cel-
lebrite UFED 4PC and ADB dump using rooting exploitation
because the acquisition process is executed after the
normal boot.
By contrast, the proposed acquisition method preserves
the integrity of the entire ﬂash memory. It boots in the
ﬁrmware update mode and physical acquisition is per-
formed using the ﬂash memory read command. Thus, we
compared the JTAG-based acquisition method to conﬁrm
whether the integrity of the entire ﬂash memory was
maintained. For the accuracy of the results, the experi-
mentation processes were followed as the previous study
(Son et al., 2013). We compared the hash values of the
dumped images after acquiring ﬁve times.
Acquisition speed
Due to the rapid increase in the use of smartphones, the
number of smartphones that needs to be analyzed is also
increasing sharply. Because the number of evidence phones
that need to be examined is large, it is not easy to use the
JTAG-based acquisition method, which requires an acqui-
sition time that exceeds 8 h in the ﬁeld. Thus, fast S/W-
based acquisition methods are often used. Therefore, we
conducted an experiment to compare the acquisition time
for the entire ﬂash memory and the results are shown in
Table 5. The results represent the mean values of the
acquisition times of 8 models. The proposed method can
set the maximum size of the smartphone to send data to a
PC, so it required about 30 min on average to acquire the
32 GB ﬂash memory, which was about four times faster
than the acquisition time with the other methods.
Physical acquisition from screen-locked smartphones (USB
debugging disabled)
Most S/W-based forensic tools use the ADB protocol for
physical acquisition. USB debugging must be enabled on
the smartphone to use the ADB protocol. However, all
Android smartphones are delivered with USB debugging
disabled for security reasons. Thus, USB debugging should
be enabled in order to apply existing acquisition methods.
Therefore, it is impossible to execute physical acquisitionusing one of the existing methods in a smartphone that is
locked by a pattern or user password (USB debugging
disabled). This shortcoming is an important issue that
needs to be resolved in the area of Android physical
acquisition. However, the proposedmethod overcomes this
problem. Even for a screen-locked smartphone, it is
possible to execute physical acquisition after turning off the
phone and rebooting in the ﬁrmware update mode.
Conclusion
We developed a new method for acquiring the entire
ﬂash memory by analyzing the ﬁrmware update protocols
of Android smartphones. We decompiled the ﬁrmware
update programs provided by manufacturers and analyzed
the ﬁrmware update protocols in the bootloader. Based on
the analytical results of ﬁrmware update protocols, we
found that the ﬂash memory read commands were pre-
served in some ﬁrmware update protocols and thus phys-
ical acquisition could be executed. When the ﬂash memory
read commands have been removed, additional research
for patching the read command is required. Based on this
new acquisition method, we developed an acquisition
program to support the physical dumping of ﬂash memory
for over 80 of the latest Android models.
By comparing the proposed tool with existing methods,
we proved that our method guarantees the integrity of the
entire ﬂash memory, which it acquires at a high speed, and
physical acquisition can be executed regardless of the re-
striction due to screen locking with a pattern or user
password (USB debugging disabled).
The proposed acquisitionmethod has the limitation that
it is necessary to analyze the ﬁrmware update protocol
whenever new Android smartphones are launched. How-
ever, because the ﬁrmware update protocol is implemented
in the bootloader of all Android smartphones and each
manufacturer applies the same ﬁrmware update protocol
to all of its models, physical acquisition can be performed
for all models of the manufacturers as long as the acquisi-
tion method by analyzing the ﬁrmware update protocol is
found. Thus, continuous research is required in this area.References
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